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Spain has a long history of using the prívate sector to help build and opérate 
public infrastructure, particularly roads. This article presents new data about toll 
motorways. The authors found that contracts in Spain are characterized by 
significant traffic overestimations and frequent renegotiations, which can lead to 
toll modifications or longer contracts. They suggest reasons for this and some 
solutions—both of which have significance for other countries. 
New means of involving the prívate sector in 
managing and financing public infrastructure 
through public-private partnerships (PPPs) and 
concession contracts are emerging in many 
countries. There are three main reasons for 
this: 
•Tightening public fmances. 
• Greater productivity efficiency. 
•Quality improvement (OECD, 2008). 
One of the most common ways of imple me nting 
pr ivate par t ic ipa t ion in manag ing 
infrastructure is through the concession 
approach, which involves transferring the 
design, construction, maintenance, and 
operation of the infrastructure to a private 
consortium. The consortium then has the right 
to charge a user fee, for a period of time 
contractually agreed in advance (Vassallo and 
Gallego, 2005). 
This article analyses key variables in Spanish 
motorway concession contracts. We evalúate 
the ultimate accuracy of cost estimates made by 
the concessionaires. Then we analyse how 
frequently contracts were renegotiated, and 
what prompted these renegotiations. We found 
a consistent bias towards traffic overestimation 
and capital cost underestimation. In addition, 
there was a distinctly high number of 
renegotiations of concession contracts in Spain. 
Once a government gets a track record of 
renegotiating concession contracts, bidders in 
competition may submit low tenders. 
Risks, estimations and renegotiation 
Risk allocation principies 
Risks in concession contracts reflect the inability 
of the stakeholders to know upfront the 
evolution of the variables which determine the 
outcome of the concession business through out 
the life of the contract. As Sirtaine et al. (2005) 
point out, concession contracts are regarded 
by the private sector as an attractive but highly 
risky business. Concession contracts are also 
risky for the government insofar as public 
guarantees by the government are provided. 
Toll motorway concessions are subject to 
several types of risk: 
• Capital cost risk (land acquisition, construction 
and license approval). 
•Revenue risk. 
•Maintenance and operational risk. 
According to the nature of the risk, we can 
classify the risks as market risks, forcé majeur 
and unpredictable risks, and legal and political 
risks (Izquierdo and Vassallo, 2004). 
There is an extensive literature regarding 
risk allocation in concession contracts 
(Loosemore, 2007; Medda, 2007). According 
to the World Bank (1997), risk allocation in 
concession contracts should take into account 
ability to get the best outcome and ability to 
manage the risk at the lowest cost. Market risks 
are usually allocated to a concessionaire, 
whereas governments generally take on forcé 
majeur, political and legislative risks. 
Risk allocation has a strong relationship 
with the financial cost of a project. The greater 
the risk allocated to the concessionaire, the 
higher the financial cost of the project. When 
the risks allocated to the concessionaire are 
very high, the financial cost of projects become 
significant, which can threaten the ultimate 
financial feasibility of the project. This is the 
reason why public guarantees are often 
provided. These guarantees facilítate the 
financial feasibility of the project at the expense 
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of allocating a greater risk to the government. 
How to allocate traffic risk? 
Estimating trafile risk in motorway concessions is 
difíicult. A distinction needs to be made between 
'brownfield' projeets (concessions based on an 
existing facility) and 'greenfield' projeets 
(concessions that have to be built from scratch). 
Ofcourse, estimating traffic in brownfield projeets 
is much easier than in greenfield projeets. 
Once aproject is operational, the evolution 
of traffic throughout the life of the concession 
depends mostly on variables that are outside 
the control of the concessionaire, such as 
economic growth, u rban development , 
competition with other transport modes, and 
so on. Nevertheless, the concessionaire is still 
able to influence the evolution of traffic through 
pricing measures, information to the users, 
quality of service and so on. 
There is a controversy regarding the 
stakeholder to whom traffic risk should be 
allocated in concession contraets. Some countries, 
such as the UK in its DBFO contraets, have 
tended to progressively untie the revenues 
obtained by the DBFO contractor from traffic by 
linking revenue to performance-based indicator s 
in terms of safety, availability and so on. Other 
countries, such as Spain, France, Italy, the USA 
and many Latin America countries, tend to 
allocate traffic risk in concession contraets, at 
least in part, to the private sector (Izquierdo and 
Vassallo, 2004). More recently, many countries 
have started to introduce mechanisms in their 
contraets to share traffic risk between the private 
and the publie sector (see Vassallo, 2006). 
Accuracy ofpredicting traffic flow and costs 
In this section we analyse the inaecuracy of the 
estimation of traffic and capital investment. We 
focus on traffic and capital investment because 
they are the most important factors in terms of 
profitability. 
The largest study dealing with forecasting 
accuracy for transport projeets was conducted by 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2005). In this study 210 projeets 
(183 of them road projeets) were analysed in 14 
countries. Most of these projeets were publicly-
procured projeets, so traffic projections were 
conducted by the government. It was found that 
traffic was generally not overestimated in road 
projeets when the projections are conducted by 
governments. 
The most complete study dealing with traffic 
forecasting accuracy in toll road concessions was 
done by Bain and Polakovic (2005) and was 
based on 104 toll roads. Toll road concessionaires 
were found to overestimate first year traffic by 
20% to 30%. This study also demonstrated that 
bank-commissioned forecasts were consistently 
less p rone to large errors than those 
commissioned by bidders. This result suggests 
that the lack of accuracy in the estimation of 
traffic is not just linked to modelling. 
Regarding cost overruns in transport 
infrastructure projeets, the broadest study was 
conducted by Flyvbjerg et al. (2004). This study, 
based on a sample of 258 projeets (rail, bridge, 
tunnel and road projeets), found cost overruns 
of 34% in PPP projeets and 110% in state-owned 
enterprises compared with 23% for publicly-
owned projeets. This study concludes that the 
claim that publie ownership is problematic and 
private ownership is effective in curbing cost 
escalation is an oversimplification. 
Renegotiations of contraets 
The word 'renegotiation' usually has a negative 
connotation. However, renegotiations do not 
necessarily produce a negative final outeome for 
the publie sector. A renegotiation could be in the 
publie interest if all the stakeholders involved 
are better off after the renegotiation takes 
place (Huberman and Kahn, 1988). However, 
as Hooper (2008) points out, renegotiation is 
detrimental if it is anticipated by the operator 
when submitting the first bid. Most of the confliets 
in concession contraets have been solved by 
renegotiation, which explains why most of the 
failed contraets have never been terminated 
(Harris, 2003). 
Guasch (2004) studied more than 100 
concession contraets awarded in Latin America 
from 1985 to 2000. The percentage of transport 
concessions that were renegotiated was 54.7%. 
These renegotiations mostly benefited the 
concessionaires. Renegotiations are much more 
common in those concessions awarded 
competitively than in those concessions awarded 
through direct negotiation (Guasch et al., 2008). 
This result can be seen as an empirical explanation 
of what is called 'the winner's curse' (Hong and 
Shum, 2002), where aggressive bids in 
competitive tenders lead to low bids by the 
concessionaire. 
Bias 
There are several ways of procuring concession 
contraets. The two most popular approaches are 
the 'open procedure' and the 'negotiated 
procedure', as defined by EU legislation. The 
open procedure involvesgrantingthe concession 
to the best offer in terms of a set of criteria 
defined by the government in advance. Any 
consortium that meets the bidding r equirements 
fixed by the government (generally involving 
experience in operating motorways and financial 
strength) is allowed to bid. Before the tender 
takes place, the government writes a standard 
contract, which will establish the future 
relationship with the eventual concessionaire. 
This standard contract is mostly fixed by the 
government with the exception of some specific 
aspects, which are to be completed by the bidders 
in their written offer. These aspects are the 
criteria on the basis of which the government will 
decide the best offer. 
The negotiated procedure is based on a 
negotiation between the government and a few 
preferred bidders who have been prequalified 
by the government. Unlike the open procedure, 
contracts are not standard—they are tailor-made. 
The open procedure is more common in 
civil law countries such as Spain or Germany. 
The negotiated procedure is more usual in 
common law countries such as the UK, even 
though it has also been implemented in some 
civil law countries, for example Portugal. 
The open procedure has advantages and 
drawbacks compared to the negotiated 
procedure. Tendering costs are lower in the 
open procedure (Sánchez-Soliño and Gago, 
2010), however, the contract will not be as 
complete as a negotiated contract. 
A report by Silva (2000) points out that one 
of the reasons why some concession contracts 
ultimately fail is due to traffic overestimation. He 
shows how these projects have to be often 
renegotiated. Moreover,Athias and Nuñez (2008) 
show that bidders tend to bid more aggressively 
and strategically in institutional frameworks in 
which renegotiating is easier. Consequently, a 
government's willingness to renegotiate is crucial 
for the bidders in their decisión to commit 
strategic errors. 
AccordingtoPingHo (2006), if a government 
is willing to renegotiate, it implicitly encourages 
aggressive bidding. This situation may cause a 
vicious cycle' in the concession tender since 
competition for concession contracts is fierce—if 
governments show a historical track record of 
renegotiation, bidders will be encouraged to 
Ínflate their forecast tojustify aggressive offers in 
order to increase their possibilities of winning 
the tender. Once the contract is secured, the 
concessionaire assumes that the government will 
renegotiate the agreement. 
Inefficient renegotiations in concession 
contracts end up being very costly for either 
users or taxpayers. Renegotiations often lead to 
subsidies by the government or changes in the 
concession contract that lead to tolls increases or 
extensión in the length of the contracts (Guasch, 
2004). This is the reason why this behaviour 
should not be called the 'winner's curse' but, 
rather, the 'user's or the taxpayer's' curse since 
the users or the taxpayers will be the ones who, 
in the end, will suffer the consequences of the 
renegotiation. 
Case study 
Spain has a long experience of toll motorway 
concessions (Acérete et al., 2009) and has passed 
laws governing these contracts. Since 1967, the 
Spanish government has granted 32 toll 
motorway concessions. There are two distinct 
periods in the history of toll motorway concessions 
in Spain (Vassallo and Sánchez-Soliño, 2007). In 
thefirstperiod,from 1967 to 1975,15motorway 
contracts were awarded. The Toll Motorway 
Concession Law was passed in 1972 to regúlate 
contracts. 
Between 1976 to 1995, concessions were not 
used for public infrastructure in Spain. The 
Socialist government opted to modernize the 
road network by widening and upgrading the 
most important roads, turning them into dual 
carriageways (double lañe fast roads) with quality 
standards well below those for toll motorways. 
This new programme was completely funded by 
the public sector (Izquierdo, 1997). 
The second period is from 1996 to the 
present. During this second period, the governing 
People's Party (Partido Popular) re-introduced 
the concession model. This trend towards prívate 
funding was reinforced by a new Public Works 
Concession Law, passed in 2003, which widened 
and updated the Toll Motorway Concession Law 
1972. In 2004, the Socialist Party and the 
concession mechanism was reintroduced as a 
means of financing public infrastructure. 
Features of concession contracts in Spain 
Toll motorway concessions in Spain have had 
the same distinctive features over the years, even 
though there are some differences between the 
concessions awarded in the first period (1967-
1975) and the concessions awarded in the second 
period (from 1996). 
Unlike other long-term infrastructure 
contracts in the world (for example DBFO 
contracts in the UK or Portugal), toll concession 
contracts in Spain are awarded on the basis of 
the open procedure. The concession contracts 
are consequently rather incomplete, since they 
are based on standard contracts rather than on 
tailor-made contracts. 
Máximum toll levéis are established in the 
concession contracts and tolls can be updated 
every year in line with inflation. However, 
from 2000 onwards, a mechanism allowing 
greater toll increases if traffic was lower than 
expected was introduced (Bel and Fagueda, 
2005). 
Accuracy ofthe estimates and renegotiations 
Information about the performance of toll 
motorway concessions in Spain is sparse and 
difficult to obtain (Acérete et ai, 2009). One of 
the major contributions of this article, therefore, 
is the up-to-date dataset. We were able to 
obtain this data because we had access to the 
ñnancial plans submitted by the concessionaires 
in their tenders, which until recently had not 
been disclosed. We obtained the ñnancial plans, 
in which traffic and capital cost estimates were 
included, from the archives of the Ministerio 
de Fomento (Spanish Ministry of Public Works). 
In addition, we investigated renegotiations 
and their causes based on the information 
published in the Official Diary of Spain. Table 
1 shows the concession contracts that were 
ultimately renegotiated; the number of 
renegot ia t ions (broken down into 
renegotiations where causes were published 
and unpublished); and the number of years 
from the concession award to the first 
renegotiation. Table 2 shows the final outcome 
of the renegotiat ions where causes are 
published. Most of the renegotiations ended 
up with either toll modifications or extensions 
to the length ofthe concession. 
To accurately analyse toll motorway 
concessions in Spain, the concessions awarded 
during the first period (1967-1975) and the 
concessions awarded in the second period (from 
1996) must be looked at separately. Regarding 
the first period, we have only traffic predictions 
for two concessions: Tarragona-Valencia 
(awarded in 1971) and Valencia-Alicante 
(awarded in 1972). Those predictions were 
conducted by the concessionaire and were 
included in the projects' business plans. On 
average, real traffic was less than 50% of the 
traffic predicted throughout the life of the 
contract. There were four reasons for this bad 
result: the projects were greenfield projects so 
traffic was difficult to estímate; traffic modelling 
tools were not very sophisticated at this time; 
the world economic crisis reduced Spain's GDP 
growth expectations; and fierce competition 
led the bidders to make aggressive bids. This 
latter issue can be confirmed by the fact that in 
the first years of operation, when there was no 
economic crisis, traffic flows were substantially 
lower than expected. 
So how were these concessionaires able to 
survive since traffic was by far the most 
important revenue source to recover the initial 
investment? The answer is that the Tarragona-
Valencia and the Valencia-Alicante contracts 
were renegotiated up to nine times each. The 
concession term, which was originally fixed for 
27 years for both concessions, was extended to 
47 and 48 years respectively. 
Renegotiations were common in the toll 
motorway concessions in Spain awarded in the 
first per iod, with some contracts being 
renegotiated up to 14 times. Almost all the 
concessions ended up with an extensión ofthe 
duration initially agreed in the contract. Even 
though the renegotiations were published in 
the Official Diary of Spain, the causes were 
often not expla ined—55 out the 121 
Table 1. Renegotiation of concession contracts in Spain. 
Ñame of motorway 
Barcelona-La Junquera 
Mongat-Mataró 
Barcelona-Tarragona 
Montmeló-El Papiol 
Zaragoza-Mediterráneo 
Villalba-Villacastín 
Villacastín-Adanero 
Bilbao-Behobia 
Burgos-Málzaga 
Sevilla-Cádiz 
Tarragona-Valencia 
Valencia-Alicante 
El Ferrol-F. portuguesa 
Bilbao-Zaragoza 
León-Campomanes 
Málaga-Estepona 
R-4 Madrid-Ocaña 
Total 
Concession 
period 
First 1967-75 
First 1967-75 
First 1967-75 
First 1967-75 
First 1967-75 
First 1967-75 
First 1967-75 
First 1967-75 
First 1967-75 
First 1967-75 
First 1967-75 
First 1967-75 
First 1967-75 
First 1967-75 
First 1967-75 
Second 1996-2008 
Second 1996-2008 
No. of renegotiations 
where cause was 
published 
2 
2 
3 
3 
7 
7 
5 
7 
3 
3 
5 
7 
7 
5 
66 
No. of renegotiations 
where cause was 
not published 
7 
5 
3 
3 
2 
1 
4 
2 
4 
6 
4 
7 
2 
3 
1 
1 
55 
No. of renegotiations 
9 
7 
6 
6 
9 
8 
9 
9 
7 
9 
9 
14 
9 
8 
1 
1 
121 
Years until the first 
renegotiation took place 
17 
16 
4 
9 
13 
9 
14 
5 
8 
10 
5 
1 
5 
6 
4 
3 
renegotiations were not attributed to any 
specific cause. 
For the concessions in the second period, 
we found that traffic overestimations by the 
concessionaires were still a common trend in 
motorway concession contracts, although on 
average the overestimation was not as large as 
it was in the contracts awarded in the first 
period (see table 3). The levéis of traffic 
overestimation were especially high for 
suburban concessions a r o u n d Madrid 
MetropolitanArea (Radial 2, Radial 4, Radial 3 
and 5, and the new access to Madrid Barajas 
Airport)—overestimations were between 52% 
and 63%. 
In terms of renegotiation of concession 
contracts, the trend in the second period is 
quite different, since only two concessions have 
been renegotiated to date (although some are 
likely to be renegotiated soon—see Arenes 
[2009]). This may be because these concessions 
are still quite recent or because Spanish 
concessionaires are strong companies that own 
a portfolio of concessions within which there 
are oíd concessions that are currently generating 
plenty of cash so they can weather a poorly-
performing contract (Ministerio de Fomento, 
2007). 
Apart from traffic, we also conducted an 
analysis ofthe accuracy of the capital investment 
predictions in the first and the second period 
(see table 3). In the first period, we obtained 
information of seven concessions out of 10, so 
the sample is much better than it is for traffic 
analysis. We were able to evalúate the whole 
sample for the second period. The results show 
a t rend towards underest imating capital 
investmentcosts. In other words, cost overruns 
were reported. In the first period, concessions 
had on average cost overruns of 15.5% whereas, 
in the second period, concessions had on 
average cost overruns of 11.8%. Atrend towards 
underes t imat ing capital investment was 
detected, but this trend is slightly smaller than 
the average cost overruns estimated by 
Flyvbjerget al. (2004) for an international world 
of PPPs. So motorway concessionaires in Spain 
are not underestimating capital investment 
more than the average of pr ivate 
concessionaires in other countries. 
Table 2. Outcome of renegotiations. 
Outcome Percentage of 
renegotiations 
Toll modification 
Extensión ofthe concession duration 
Other outcomes 
50% 
24% 
26% 
Discussion and conclusions 
This article shows that toll motorway concession 
contracts in Spain are characterized by two 
features: significant traffic overestimations and 
frequent renegotiat ions. A considerable 
percentage of the renegotiations can not be 
attributed to any cause, and most of them 
resulted in higher tolls or longer contracts. 
We attribute this behaviour to two causes. 
First, the 'winner's curse', which can be 
accentuated when bidders know that a 
government is willing to renegotiate; and, 
second, to the allocation of traffic risk to the 
concessionaires when this risk is something 
they cannot manage. Renegotiations generally 
impactusers (higher tolls) andtaxpayers (longer 
concession periods or government subsidies). 
This is the reason why we think it would be 
better to cali this phenomenon the 'user's curse' 
or the 'taxpayer's curse' instead ofthe 'winner's 
curse'. 
Neither users ñor taxpayers have tended 
to complain very much about this situation. On 
the one hand, the government does not give 
much publicity to the renegotiation processes, 
and explanations are not given. On the other 
hand, Spain does not have a regulator to defend 
the interests ofthe users and the taxpayers in 
the concession contracts. 
The user's curse and lack of regulado n is in 
need of systematic policy treatment. There 
may be merit, for example, in removing the 
dependency of concessionaire revenues on the 
actual traffic flow. This might be achieved with 
the introduction of other payment approaches, 
such as the ones implemented in the UK where 
the contractor's revenue primarily depends on 
per formance , and t h r o u g h traffic risk 
mitigation mechanisms such as the Least Present 
Valué of the Revenues (Engel et ai, 1997) 
implemented in Chile. There may also be merit 
in the creation of an independent regulator to 
Table 3. Accuracy of traffic and capital cost estimates and percentage of concessions 
renegotiated. 
Traffic estímate accuracy 
(real-forecast)/forecast 
Average capital cost 
estímate accuracy 
(real-forecast)lforecast 
Percentage of concessions 
renegotiated 
Oíd toll motorways (1967-1975) -62.51% 
Modern toll motorways (1996-present) -25.28% 
15.43% 
11.83% 
100% 
17% 
r e p r e s e n t t h e in te res t s of u se r s a n d t h e 
taxpayers w h e n a renegot ia t ion process is 
initiated. • 
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